This research piece was written by Elouan Pannegeon, a brilliant History student at the prestigious Utrecht University. His work was supervised by Professor Francois Lenfant.

This research is a dive into an in-depth analysis of Chiquita Brand International’s operations in Colombia from 1989 to 2004, uncovering the intricate balance between legal compliance and ethical responsibility during the local civil war.

Introduction.

The words musa acuminata and musa balbisiana may sound unfamiliar to most people, yet they are among the most popular foods worldwide. They refer to the two most consumed types of bananas. Everyone has eaten one of these at least once in their lifetime. Nowadays, the banana market is massive: the central exporting region is South America, accounting for 14.5 million tonnes in 2022, and the central importing region is the European Union, with around 5 million tonnes (26.7%), followed by the United States (4 million tonnes – 21.7%).[1] Moreover, the market represents USD 140.84 billion in 2024, which makes it the most important fruit market.[2] One of the economic giants sharing in this activity is known for their blue stickers, their corporate mascot, and their advertising campaigns: Chiquita Brand International (also called “Chiquita” or “Chiquita Brands”). Such a corporation is so implemented in the countries where it produces bananas that it becomes a non-state actor in internal politics, peace, and conflict processes.

Theoretical, Historical, and Historiographical Background.

Non-state actors are “non-governmental groups who directly or indirectly engage in support of non-governmental combatants in non-international and purely internal conflicts.”[3] This definition comprises business actors. Multinational corporations (MNCs) control economic activities across national boundaries. Chiquita Brand International can be awarded this status since it operates in multiple countries and its activity ranges internationally. Chiquita (initially named “Boston Fruit Company”) is an American fruit company specializing in producing and exporting bananas globally. It was created in the nineteenth century by a wealthy American entrepreneur, Lorenzo Dow Baker.[4] With time, Chiquita Brand International began expanding its range of activity to other territories and entered Central and Southern American countries. The American firm proved influential in many political disputes in the countries in which it operates, like in Colombia and the civil war that the country has been drowning in since 1964. This internal conflict opposes the successive Colombian governments to leftist guerrillas, including Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejercito Popular (FARC-EP), and the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN), far-right paramilitary groups such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), but also drug cartels including the Medellín and the Cali cartels. Each of the belligerents fought for their interests, ranging from the political administration of a given territory, economic development, or simply harassing civilians and spreading terror. The conflict originated in La Violencia (1928-1958). This period saw the Liberal and Conservative parties fight over the country’s administration, thereby setting the basis for the events this research is interested in. Since then, the growing violence has led the government to lose its administrative capabilities outside big cities like Bogotá, the capital. For most Colombians, the concept of a central governing entity was foreign. Local actors administered on the smaller level.[5] Thus, companies like Chiquita Brand International did not encounter difficulties developing a profitable business to the detriment of political stability. As the research will address later, Chiquita had relationships with armed groups in the Northern region of Urabá, which ultimately led to an increase in the level of violence in the area. Briefly, the American corporation made payments to guerrillas and the paramilitaries between 1989 and 2004 to protect their plantations and workers. Also, the “Chiquita Papers” (official documentation proving relationships between the corporation and armed groups) demonstrated that the corporation contributed to routing weapons. Altogether, these actions sustained violence and terror. As of this, Colombia and its inhabitants have lived in constant violence since the 1920s, which led Arturo Wallace to argue in the BBC that the five-decades-long civil war ended up impacting every single inhabitant of the country.[6] Massacres, rapings, or non-lethal coercion have been the daily routine for millions of civilians.[7] Although the government has made progress in dealing with armed groups, primarily by signing peace accords with the AUC and the FARC, the conflict has not yet been declared over by the authorities since smaller groups continue perpetrating violence.[8]

Chiquita Brand International’s involvement in the Colombian Civil War is among the first cases of multinational corporations influencing an internal conflict; at least, it was the first studied as much. More generally, academic production about multinational corporations’ involvement in conflict and peace processes approaches several topics. Juliette Bennett outlines corporations’ four action levers to influence conflict and peace processes. MNCs can impact conflicts through their core business (1), social investment programs (2), policy dialogue (3), and civic institution-building engagement (4).[9] Other authors like Ralph Hamann and Paul Kapelus approached the notion of “corporate social responsibility.” It is “a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment (…). That is, company efforts at responding to stakeholders, minimizing negative impacts, and maximizing positive impacts are said to have a positive effect on profits, at least in the medium-long term.”[10] This historiography can be mixed with ethics’, leading thus to the notion of “business ethics.” The latter addresses how businesses can act (un-)ethically in their field of activity, thereby influencing (positively or negatively) the course of a conflict. Representatives of this historiographical field are T. L. Fort and C. A. Schipiani, who outlined different approaches for businesses to follow to bring peace to their environments. One of their central arguments is that empirically, there is a highly positive correlation between underdevelopment and armed conflict.[11] Thus, businesses generally find economic advantages in acting upon socio-political stability (even though some willingly fuel conflict for x or y reasons). The book also presents the tight relationship between business ethics and human rights. This is further approached by Robert McCorquodale, who explained the frame of action to sustain human rights: “Protect, Respect, and Remedy.” In his perspective, states and businesses must respect human rights laws.[12]

Regarding Chiquita in Colombia, the academic historiography is wealthy. It is garnished with hundreds, if not thousands, of articles and books that approach the topic using different perspectives. The wealthiness of the historiography can be explained by, first, the novelty of the subject and, second, by the juridic repercussion of Chiquita Brands’ involvement in Colombian political life. Indeed, the American corporation was brought to court for its actions to be judged since the groups it entertained relationships with were on the American list of terrorist organizations.[13] Two main trends can be observed from scholars’ different perspectives when addressing Chiquita. One part of the scholarly production focuses on how Chiquita Brand International’s involvement in the Colombian Civil War has enhanced violence and fueled the conflict. The armed groups the corporation had relationships with committed violence towards civilians using Chiquita’s dollars to finance it. An example illustrating this trend is Andreas Schotter and May Teagarden’s article. The authors explained how Chiquita used its Colombian subsidiary, Banadex S. A., to connect with the AUC, the FARC, and the ELN.[14] Another publication that has a rather negative view of Chiquita is Marina Prieto-Carrón’s 2006 article about women in plantations. Although the author approaches the limits of Chiquita’s corporate social responsibility regarding their female workers in South America, Prieto-Carrón still acknowledges that efforts to implement CSR were (and are still) made by the company.[15] Her perspective on Chiquita’s impact on conflict processes is more nuanced. Finally, Marco Werre presents Chiquita as a pioneer of corporate social responsibility implementation in corporate governance. In his article, he outlined the corporate process through which high officials at Chiquita enhanced their employees’ working and living conditions. From the 1990s onwards, every corporate decision was based on CSR.[16]

Research Question.

This research will assess Chiquita’s ethics in Colombia between 1989 and 2004. Is Chiquita an ethical business? The answer to this question has not yet been given by all the scholars who wrote about the corporation, maybe because the subject is highly philosophical or because of its broadness. This research aims to fill this historiographical gap. As of this, this paper will answer the following:

To what extent does Chiquita Brand International’s respect for human rights testify to ethical behavior in their Colombian business from 1989 to 2004?

To dissect this research question, other (narrower) interrogations can be subjects to attention. To what extent does respect for human rights make a business ethic or not? Is a corporation ethical just by respecting human rights, or should it go further in its governance to be considered as such? What elements made Chiquita a (un-)ethical corporation in Colombia between 1989 and 2004? This paper will argue that Chiquita Brand International has been an unethical company in Colombia for its links with armed groups, which fueled the conflict. However, the paper acknowledges and argues that efforts have been made to improve the corporation’s respect for human rights in its activity, thereby developing its ethics. The answer to whether Chiquita is an ethical business or not cannot fully tend toward one or the other side of the balance. This discussion is subjective, but the study aims to provide the most precise and neutral assessment of Chiquita Brand International’s ethics.

Research Method.

            This paper is the product of weeks of research about Chiquita’s ethics. Several sources were analyzed to produce this assessment. Sources are of different types, primary and secondary, but mostly secondary. The latter comprise the literature pieces mentioned above (among others) whose analysis allowed for the creation of ethical criteria to assess Chiquita’s ethics. For example, Campbell Garnett’s work defines essential concepts like “obligation” or “good.”[17] Although the article is significantly older than the rest of the sources, it is an understandable account of such concepts. Other sources include Arnold’s account of the recent history of the United Nations initiatives regarding business and human rights. Also, the tripartite framework[18]  is placed into a historical context. The secondary sources alone cannot be the sole basis of this paper’s argumentation, so primary sources were also used. Among them, Chiquita’s 2000 corporate responsibility report was helpful since it presented the corporation’s perspective regarding its social and environmental development policies and ethics.[19] Another primary source is Hollman Morris’ documentary published in 2009. It regroups testimonies from people who were directly or indirectly impacted by the Chiquita-financed massacres Colombians suffered from paramilitaries between 1989 and 2004.[20] Although the primary sources argue legitimate claims, the study remains critical since they all borrow a different perspective concerning the same topic. Chiquita’s report does not present the corporation as Hollman Morris does in his documentary, even though the subject is the same. As of this, this study engages itself in mobilizing as many primary and secondary sources as possible to have the most global and detailed assessment of Chiquita’s ethics in Colombia from 1989 to 2004.

Chapter 1: Building a Theoretical Framework.

As we embark on this research journey, it is important to acknowledge that it is essential to define the fundamental concepts of our research question, “human rights” and “ethical behavior.” Their meaning can vary depending on one’s perspective. This research is structured around these concepts and respects and values the diverse perspectives the readers bring. Therefore, it aims to provide a comprehensive framework that respects these diverse viewpoints.

Human Rights.

The concept of “human rights” can be defined in many ways. Different definitions incorporate different variables, including other actors or different basic rights. The United Nations defines “human rights” as “rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, and any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more.”[21] The liberties mentioned in this definition constitute basic rights, which are necessary for attaining other rights without which it is impossible to live a decent human life.[22] The definition provided by the UN includes every human being. At the same time, Martha C. Nussbaum (for example) considers that human rights are granted to people by virtue of being adults only, which technically excludes all people aged below eighteen.[23] Shouldn’t children be given human rights as well? Given the variety of definitions available to the public, this research will stick with the United Nations because it is the broadest and the most recognized among academia. The UN definition is further developed by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), a 2011 initiative aiming at creating a normative framework to guide responsible business conduct and address human rights abuses in business operations and global supply chains. These guiding principles (pillars) are to protect, respect, and remedy.[24] Moreover, a tripartite framework can be employed to understand human rights adequately. It includes a political conception, where human rights are seen as emerging from political enterprises by states, international organizations, or non-governmental organizations. The tripartite also includes a legal conception of human rights related to international and national human rights laws, which is about how actors are legally bound to respect human rights matching global and local criteria. The framework is completed by a moral conception of human rights that considers their respect as a duty for involved actors, including (among others) states and multinational corporations.[25] This research will mainly employ the legal and moral perspectives on human rights understanding since they involve the concept of “duty.” Corporations have the moral duty to respect basic human rights even when doing so will result in higher production costs.[26]

Finally, it should be mentioned that the legal perspective differs from the human rights and ethical perspectives. A corporation that respects laws about human rights is not necessarily moral. The corporation could respect human rights in the strictest ways possible, that is, not overcoming standards because the costs would result higher, yet respecting the law. A corporation that indeed acts ethically goes beyond human rights standards and regulations. An ethical corporation systematically works on improving its governance toward environmental and human sustainability.

Ethics & Ethical Business.

What is an ethical business? Again, this question is highly subjective, and its answer can vary from one person to another. A simple way of presenting ethical companies is to say that they are corporations that act ethically. Ethics is the “communal exercise in which we attempt to work out the rights and obligations we have and share with others (…) Ethics try to find a way to protect one person’s rights and needs against and alongside the rights and needs of others.”[27] In other words, ethics is the study of human morals and behavior towards himself and others. A person is said to be acting ethically when it behaves respecting morals that are considered “good.” Nevertheless, the perception of goodness varies according to people and society. A person behaving ethically in a given society may not be regarded as ethical in another given society. The same applies to corporations. An ethical business’s governance is based on respect for human rights and stakeholders’ interests. Still, these standards can change from one region to another, implying that a corporation can act ethically or unethically in different areas. Then how can somebody judge a corporation’s level of ethics? One must analyze its governance. “Corporate governance has been defined generally as a top management process that, when operating correctly, should manage value creation and value transference among various corporate claimants in a way that ensures accountability towards those claimants.”[28] In doing so, one can understand the relationship between high-level management and low-level employees. In the case of Chiquita, analyzing the corporation’s governance allows us to assess its level of ethics in Colombia.

Criteria to assess the ethics of Chiquita.

The academic literature review made possible the development of a list of criteria for assessing the ethics of a corporation. First, a corporation does not act ethically simply by respecting human rights and meeting human rights standards. Still, it does so by going further in this direction to truly improve and ease the living and working conditions of the corporation’s employees. As explained earlier, an ethical corporation acts ethically toward its employees’ interests to create a prosperous working environment. This contributes to social, political, and economic stability, which meets the corporation’s interests later. Businesses need stability to thrive. Stability can benefit companies, from trading to creativity or economic growth.[29] The criteria employed to assess Chiquita’s level of ethics are the following.

• A stakeholder-oriented governance. In this type of administration, stakeholders – every person impacting the corporation’s activities – are at the center of policy-making reflection. That is, every policy decided by the company’s managing board is agreed upon in the interest of the stakeholders. Stakeholders include (but are not limited to) employees, consumers, customers, and business partners.

• Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). It is “a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment (…). That is, company efforts at responding to stakeholders, minimizing negative impacts, and maximizing positive impacts are said to have a positive effect on profits, at least in the medium-long term.”[30] In using CSR, corporations behave ethically towards their stakeholders. “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” are usually the three prominent charts companies operate in.[31] Companies using CSR in their governance aim to protect and respect their stakeholders’ integrity and interests. If these are violated, the company is engaged in providing adequate remedies by moral obligations.

• Promoting peace and stability. Peace can be understood in two ways: negative and positive.[32] Negative peace is the absence of violence in a defined area, the process of shutting guns down; positive peace regroups the actions addressing structural issues leading to violence and reaching human rights. In that sense, long-term stability is brought. Companies that promote peace in unstable regions they operate can be considered ethical. More than ethics, promoting peace should be seen as natural economic behavior since peace fosters economic development. In gross terms, businesses make more money during peace times. Companies can act upon (both types of) peace in four different ways. First, they can stimulate economic development by providing jobs to locals, transferring resources (both materials and immaterial – technological or managerial transfers), and paying taxes. Second, corporations can contribute to negotiations through track-two diplomacy because they are external actors in the internal dilemmas of their operating countries. They can also help understand local cleavages in the working environment. Third, companies contribute to peace by welcoming external evaluation principles like transparency. In doing so, corporations accept their data and internal information to become public. Transparency is mainly used to prevent corruption and to support the rule of law. Fourth, businesses act upon peace by creating a sense of community within their employees. This managerial process aims to bring people from different ethnic and political backgrounds together. Reuniting them under the same cause can reduce violence, foster reconciliation, and peace.[33] “A model of communities with corporations is a potential model for peaceful societies.”[34]

Chapter 2: The Unethical Behavior of Chiquita Brand International in Colombia.

Payments to armed groups.

            On May 3^rd, 1998, Cincinnati Enquirer’s investigators Mike Gallagher and Cameron McWhirter published an eighteen-page-long article exposing Chiquita Brand International. In their paper, they accused the multinational of having paid the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a right-wing paramilitary operating in the Colombian countryside. This armed group is known for its criminal activity against other groups, such as the FARC and ELN, but also against Colombian civilians. The two journalists based their claims on illegally acquired sets of vocal and written communication among the high management board of the company. This publication caused trouble to the journalists, who were obliged to present public apologies and remove their publication/accusation. Also, the Cincinnati Enquirer had to pay USD 10 million as compensation to the banana corporation. On the other hand, Chiquita Brand was not conducted because of the accusations the journalists presented since the latter hacked the corporation to obtain classified information, which stands as a crime in the United States. Chiquita was the victim, not the victimizer, but this affair revealed the corporation’s relationships with the AUC.[35]

            Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chiquita’s control of Colombia’s banana exports, as well as territorial possessions, increased. In 1989, Banadex (the Colombian subsidiary of Chiquita) controlled 8.5% of Colombian banana exports and 11% in 1994.[36] As of this, the American corporation was at the heart of Colombian politics, especially in the northern region of Urabá, where it operated. Urabá is a key area of the country. It makes the junction between the Colombian countryside and the Caribbean Sea, which allows for important traffick of drugs and weapons. Coupled with great fertility, Urabá represents high stakes for armed groups, corporations, and drug cartels, which makes it an “epicenter of the armed confrontation.”[37] In that context, Chiquita Brand International realized monthly payments to the AUC from 1997 to 2004 (compelting small irregular payments to the FARC since 1989), reaching USD 1.7 million. These payments were considered a necessary investment by Chiquita’s high management board. By paying the AUC, they supposedly secured their activity from violence in the region. These payments were realized in the interests of the shareholders and the business; Colombia had become essential for Chiquita, so losing it because of internal conflict was not an option.[38] In this corporate behavior, Chiquita’s priorities are clear: its shareholders and its profitability, which go in opposition to the ethical criteria that this research has previously presented. In this regard, Chiquita Brand International could be considered an unethical company.

Moreover, Éver Veloza (alias “H.H.” – a leader of the AUC) explained that the USD 1.7 million represented a mandatory tax that every banana corporation had to pay to the AUC in order to operate in the region. It was not directed to Chiquita in particular. He also said that Chiquita helped the armed group with logistics by routing weaponry using their commercial fleet.[39] It is difficult to know whether Chiquita’s intentions were to contribute to AUC’s activity or to secure its presence in Urabá. The most probable is that the corporation knew about AUC’s activity, but economic profit came before. Banana workers’ high adherence to work syndicates impacted productivity via strikes or social requests, and the AUC battled against that, so why not finance them? On the other hand, the threat of violence against the business might have convinced the corporation about the necessity of these payments. One thing is sure: Chiquita did not predict the impact these payments had on local societies. The corporation’s dollars were used to finance war, and atrocities were committed against local civilians, including unionized banana workers![40] Also, by financing this far-right paramilitary, Chiquita not only indirectly committed atrocities but enhanced AUC’s authority in the region (and the country in general) to the detriment of the Colombian government. This further fueled the Colombian Civil War.[41]

Violation of Human Rights.

            It is undoubtful that by financing (willingly or unwillingly) the AUC, Chiquita Brand International got involved in human rights violations. The payments Chiquita made to the AUC fueled the Colombian Civil War. Hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians were victims of atrocities, including but not limited to rape, assassination, and torture. These atrocities go against the basic liberties that constitute human rights. Needless to say, the right to live, or the right to be free from torture and inhuman treatment (for example), were ignored by the victims’ executioners and the executioners’ backers.[42] Also, even though Chiquita Brands never officially opposed the right to assemble – in a syndicate aiming at defending and improving workers’ rights –, the corporation did not move a finger when people were killed because they adhered to working unions. An example of such is the case of Wilson Borja Diaz, the leader of Federación Nacional de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado, a worker association entertaining relationship with banana syndicates. Because of his involvement in workers’ rights defense, which included the right to strike and improved working/living conditions, the AUC undertook an assassination attempt on him on December 15, 2000. During the street gunfight, he and his two bodyguards were seriously wounded, while a street vendor was killed.[43] This event is not isolated. The AUC designated trade union workers and human rights activists as primary targets because they saw them as sympathizers of the guerrillas.[44] The AUC’s policy of social cleansing might have benefitted Chiquita because workers striking is unprofitable, and workers demanding more rights require increased governance efforts, ultimately leading to more investments. Chiquita’s behavior goes against the moral duty to defend human rights, and the necessity to promote peace and stability in its active areas, which makes the corporation’s ethics decrease in that respect. Also, as incredible as it seems, Chiquita eventually recognized that they had illegal relationships with armed groups and paid a USD 25 million fine to the United States Justice Department in 2007. At that time, the AUC, the FARCS, and the ELN (all of which Chiquita made payments to between 1989 and 2004) were registered as terrorist organizations.

Testimonies from victims of Chiquita-sponsored atrocities.

Numerous testimonies of Colombians who were directly or indirectly impacted by atrocities confirm Chiquita Brand International’s violation of human rights. Governmental services like the Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica worked on keeping the victims’ experience alive through reports and audiovisual productions, such as documentaries or face-to-face testimonies. An example is the YouTube channel No mas violencia: testimonios para recordar (“No more violence: testimonies to remember”), which regroups no less than 55 short testimonies of people who suffered from violence during the Colombian conflict. Since some of the victims are still subject to oppression by their perpetrators, the people speaking are actors. Victims’ anonymousness is kept intact.[45] One of the most striking videos is “Mi cuerpo fue un territorio de Guerra” (“My Body had been a War Zone”), in which Jorge (represented by Ernesto Benjumea) explains that because of his homosexuality, he suffered from sexual and psychological violence by members of AUC.[46] His testimony is, unfortunately, not unique since violence of such nature was reported by many other organizations, such as Iniciativa de Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz (“Colombian Women Initiative for Peace”) via the words of Angela Salazar, who was interviewed by Hollman Morris in his documentary published on Contravia TV. She mentioned female banana workers being victims of the AUC and banana workers, in general, being targeted by the paramilitaries.[47] Another triggering intervention is Ivan Cepeda’s. He is a representative of Movimiento Nacional de Victimias de Crimenes de Estado (“National Movement of State Crimes Victims”) and confirmed that the victims of the paramilitaries were members of syndicates, workers in the banana plantations and that they were systematically targetted/killed by the weapons bought with Chiquita’s money. Such enterprise was also done for Chiquita to preserve its exploitation rights on strategic terrains, lands where profit could be made thanks to the quality of the land, later leading to better products. He concluded his testimony by saying that these crimes are considered “crimes against Humanity” by the local community.[48]

Although these people testify on atrocities that directly or indirectly impacted them (and involved Chiquita), it is important to maintain a critical view of their words. Certainly, the events they experienced constitute life-long traumatism, but in assessing Chiquita’s ethics in Colombia, one must analyze both perspectives, not just the victims’. This is not to disregard and downgrade anyone’s words, but this research remains critical and open to all views about the subject. Chiquita Brand International is surely working towards creating a better environment for its workers at every level of the corporation. This is the subject of the upcoming chapter of this research paper.

Chapter 3: Applying Ethical Criteria to Chiquita Brand International in Colombia.

            The previous chapter explained the extent to which Chiquita Brand International can be considered an unethical company in Colombia. Between 1989 and 2004, the corporation made payments to armed groups that committed atrocities, thereby involving the business in the fueling of the conflict. However, it must be highlighted that since the Cincinnati Enquirer affair in 1998, the American giant began a reorganization of its corporate governance. This final chapter outlines how Chiquita’s ethics increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s as a response from critics. Through its reforms, Chiquita Brand International can be seen as an ethical company in Colombia. Although this chapter’s tone is more optimistic, it does not forget to remain critical about its sourcing. Indeed, a majority of sources used to write the following paragraphs come from Chiquita Brand International itself or affiliated. On the other hand, the small number of testimonies from Colombian employees could be explained by two things. First, there could be nothing to remark; everything could be fine. Second, they could be subject to corporate pressure that encourages them to remain silent. At this research scale, it is not possible to know the truth, which opens the path to further, more elaborate research.

A Stakeholder-Oriented Governance & Corporate Social Responsibility.

            Traditionally, the American model of corporate governance is based on the shareholders, that is, people who possess a share of a given company; the people who own the company.[49] As a result, stakeholders are given little importance as long as the business grows and the production remains profitable. Until the 1990s, Chiquita Brand International adhered to this economic tradition, which made the company the subject of severe criticism from the media and human rights associations. But 1998 marked the beginning of a radical change in its governance. Via a set of major reforms, the corporation aimed to enhance the relationship between the top management and the low-level employees. Chiquita aimed at becoming a stakeholder society that is one in which the interests of non-investing parties would be more if not better, represented than investing parties.[50] This switch is confirmed by the 2000 Corporate Responsibility, written and published by Chiquita Brand International itself, to present this new perspective on governance. Their “primary goals in developing this Report were to increase employee understanding of (their) commitment to Corporate Responsibility, communicate more openly with (their) stakeholders, and improve the quality of social debate about (their) performance.”[51] By publishing such a report, Chiquita admits that it has much to learn and improve in terms of stakeholder governance but that the managing board is committed to such improvement.[52] The corporation enterprise is acknowledged by John Brookes (Senior Vice President of Société Général de Surveillance International – SA8000), who says: “This Corporate Responsibility Report provides an indication of Chiquita’s ongoing commitment to manage its banana business in a manner that respects and promotes the basic human rights of all workers.”[53] In other words, the latter confirms that Chiquita is making the establishment of corporate social responsibility a central stake in this report and their future governance. Chiquita defines CSR as their “commitment to fairly balance and legitimate needs of (their) stakeholders. These stakeholders include (their) employees, consumers, customers, business partners, competitors, governments, civil society organizations, and communities.”[54]

            Implementing corporate social responsibility can be done via a four-step process.[55] First, top management must be aware of CSR; it has to be sensitive to the idea of implementing CSR in the corporation’s governance because this represents an important investment. The triggering element can both apply to internal driving forces (management’s personal values) and external driving forces (the environment in which the case study evolves). In this research’s study case, what truly raised awareness about CSR is the Cincinnati Enquirer affair of 1998, which shed light on the corporation’s misbehavior in its plantations. This is further confirmed by the fact that this report (dated from the year 2000) is the first of its kind, coming from Chiquita Brand International, which proves that the corporation did not dedicate that much importance to CSR before the scandal. Second, to establish CSR, the corporation must formulate a clear CSR vision – a clear answer to the external environment of the organization – and craft corporate values, which allow every employee of the company to find inspiration in the structure. In response to external mediatic pressure and the corporation’s willingness to introduce CSR in its governance, a Senior Management Group For Corporate Responsibility was created in 1998 “not to merely be better than average in the agricultural sector, but to consistently demonstrate leading standards in Corporate Responsibility.”[56] This board is composed of top-management employees who have been working at Chiquita for several years each. They are also aware of the stakes CSR represents for the company and are formed in this field. To complete its CSR board, the corporation crafted central values in 1999 for every employee to respect and work by. These are Integrity, Respect, Opportunity, and Responsibility. Third, implementing CSR must pass through a change in the organizational behavior of the given corporation. The CSR vision and the core values must be applied on the ground. The direction board of the business must make efforts to decide policies that will ease this process because it is often hard for employees who work in a specific way to change their attitude along with other morals. In that regard, Chiquita Brand signed agreements with local labor unions (SINTRAINAL in Colombia, for example), which officialized the right of their employees to join them. In 2000, 84% of their Latin American employees adhered to labor unions.[57] Moreover, the company appointed a Vice President and CR Officer (Jeff Zalla) who was in charge of placing CSR at the heart of the corporation’s policy-making. Finally, Chiquita adopted the Social Accountability 8000. The SA8000 and Certification System provide a “framework for organizations of all types (…) to conduct business in a way that is fair and decent for workers and to demonstrate their adherence to the highest social standards.”[58] In that respect, Chiquita not only started meeting human rights standards (UN’s definition) but went above them. This certification leads to the fourth step of the CSR implementation process: anchoring the change, that is, strengthening the already-established measures for them to last in time. In that respect, Chiquita decided in 2001 that every corporate decision should be made in terms of CSR first and profit second. The report itself is also proof of such a shift in the corporation’s administration and this willingness to anchor CSR in time. The report introduces the public to Chiquita’s vision of CSR and its main policies, which include all the above-mentioned, but also social investments in local communities and coercive measures against employees that would not respect their new values and mores.

Promoting Peace and Stability.

To end this more optimistic chapter, the research will examine how Chiquita Brand International promotes peace and stability through its business activity and governance. To analyze Chiquita’s skills in bringing peace and stability, the research will employ Fort’s and Schipiani’s four levers of action.[59] To begin with, Chiquita Brand International was clearly one of, if not the motor of Urabá’s economy when it was established there. The corporation invested millions of dollars to foster economic activity in the region. By building adequate infrastructures of work, they not only increased their employees’ living and working conditions, but they attracted Colombians to come work in Urabá. For example, the American corporation undertook a process of renovation of local towns by building medical and educational infrastructures. Also, a large percentage of their employees are provided with housing, running drinkable water, and waste collection, services that the Colombian government is not capable of assuring in such remote areas.[60] Second, it can not be said that Chiquita did not make efforts to welcome external evaluation of its business. As seen in the previous section, the corporation received the SA8000 certification. This social accountability certificate is granted to corporations that welcome inspectors into their businesses. Their role is to compare their standards on several domains, including, but not limited to, child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours, remuneration, management, and working hours to the corporation’s working conditions. Needless to say, the banana company met all these standards, which go beyond simply respecting human rights law. Another certification the company is proud of is the Rain Forest Better Banana Project, which was received in December 2000. Tensie Whelan (Executive Director of Rainforest Alliance) says about Chiquita: “Leading by example, Chiquita had demonstrated its commitment to environmental and social responsibility through the tangible changes implemented at the farm level, resulting in improved conditions for the environment and the Company’s workers.”[61] Third, as the company confirmed, “corporate responsibility provided a practical framework for aligning the organization, building an inclusive approach to management, and holding people accountable for their actions.”[62] What this is saying is that by implementing CSR in their governance, the company created a stable ground of management that brought people together under a set of core values, norms, and morals. In this, Chiquita Brands succeeded in creating a sense of community within its workforce. Finally, mention should be made that there is no record of Chiquita Brand International engaging in track-two diplomacy. Although Chiquita entertained relationships with different actors of the Colombian conflict, including armed groups (as seen in Chapter 2) and surely the Colombian government, there is no written proof that these were oriented toward negotiations and peace-making. So, it is not possible for this research to affirm it applied this fourth lever of action to promote peace and stability.

Conclusion and Discussion.

            This research provided everyone interested in this subject with an accountable set of information. The first chapter explained how subjective the central notion of “ethics” was. This research definition may be different from the reader’s definition. As a result, an ethical business may be ethical in one country and unethical in another. In the case of Chiquita Brand International in Colombia, it is difficult to have a straight opinion since, as seen throughout the course of the paper, Chiquita undertook several actions that can lead to misinterpretations of its real intentions. On the one hand, the firm had relationships with armed groups like the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC. Through the monthly payments to the far-right paramilitary, Chiquita Brand International directly fueled the conflict since its money was used to finance the paramilitaries’ equipment. As Gloria Cuartas (ex-mayor of Apartado, Urabá) would say, “Chiquita Brands is responsible for organized crime in Antioquian Urabá.”[63] This behavior is questionable since motivation can vary from a simple desire for protection against violence to the preservation of authority over syndicated employees. The debate over the real reason for these payments remains open to discussion, and this paper encourages fellow scholars or students to further investigate the subject.

Nevertheless, the main reforms Chiquita has undertaken since 1998 give material to assess its level of ethics. As seen in Chapter 3, Chiquita Brand International began implementing CSR in its corporate governance, thereby improving the living and working conditions of its banana workers globally. They built infrastructure and provided their workers with housing and basic social services, including schooling and medical care. Together with this, a general reorganization of the corporation’s governance was achieved through the creation of CSR-dedicated corps and core values. Altogether, these reforms created a sense of community among Chiquita employees. Progress was seen in the living/working conditions under Chiquita Brand International, and this is confirmed by the certifications (SA8000 and Rain Forest Alliance Better Banana Project) that the corporation received from 2000 onwards. These certifications prove that the company goes beyond human rights standards; they prove that the company is, to some extent, ethical in its Colombian territories.

The question of whether Chiquita Brand International was an ethical business in Colombia between 1989 and 2004 remains open. Chiquita’s corporate behavior in Colombia is filled with contradictions. If Chiquita Brand International began its CSR project in 1998 after the scandal born from the Cincinnati Enquirer, why did the funding of the AUC continue until 2004? This goes against every position the corporation defended in its report presenting its new policy. So why would the corporation be this contradictive? Needless to say, this subject is blurry, and answering this question would require access to more resources like classified data, but it opens the way to relevant research.

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[1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Banana Market Review 2022 (Rome, 2023), 22 pages.

[2] Mordor Intelligence, Banana Market Size & Share Analysis – Growth Trends & Forecasts (2024-2029).

[3] Bassiouni, M. Cherif. “The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-), Vol. 98, N°3 (2008), pp. 715.

[4]  “Who’s Chiquita Brand?”, The Chiquita Story, Chiquita Brand International. Accessed February 28^th, 2024. https://www.chiquita.com/the-chiquita-story/

[5] Catherine C. LeGrand, “The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective”, in Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies/ Revue canadienne des études latino-américaines et caraïbes, Vol. 28, N°55/56 (2003), pp. 165-209.

[6] Arturo Wallace, “Colombia le pone numeros a su conflicto armado”, BBC Mundo – Colombia (July 24, 2013). https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2013/07/130724_colombia_conflicto_armado_cifras_aw

 

[7] Le Grand, “The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective”, pp. 165-209. 

[8] Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Violencia, 2013, 431 pages.

[9] Juliette Bennett, “Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, Issue 2 (2002), pp. 397.

[10] R. Hamann, P. Kapelus, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Mining in Southern Africa: Fair accountability or just greenwash”, in Development, Vol. 47, Issue 3 (2004), pp. 85-92.

[11] Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipiani, The Role of Business in Fostering Peaceful Societies (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 26.

[12] Robert McCorquodale, “Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 87 (2009), pp. 385-400.

[13] David Restrepo Amariles, “Judicializing Transnational Corporations in a Global Legal Order: The Chiquita Affair in Colombia”, in Oñati Journal of Emergent Socio-legal Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 2 (2008), pp. 1-21.

[14] Andreas Schotter, Mary Teagarden, “Blood Bananas: Chiquita in Colombia” (Thunderbird School of Global Management, 2010).

[15] Marina Prieto -Carrón, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Latin America: Chiquita, Women Banana Workers, and Structural Inequalities”, in The Journal of Corporate Citizenship, N°21 (2006), pp. 85-94.

[16] Marco Werre, “Implementing Corporate Responsibility – The Chiquita Case” in Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 44 (2003), pp. 247-260.

[17] A Campbell Garnett, “Distinctions and Definitions in Ethics”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 12, N°1 (1951), pp. 69-82.

[18] Protect, Respect, and Remedy (see Robert McCorquodale, “Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law”).

[19] Chiquita Brand International, “Chiquita Brand International, Inc. 2000 Corporate Responsibility Report” (2000), 98 pages.

[20] Hollman Morris, “Las Victimas del Banano, el Caso Chiquita” (October 2009), Contravía TV, 29 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Or_rZe6GBv8&t=12s&ab_channel=CONTRAVIATV

[21] The United Nations, “Global Issues, Human Rights”, https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/human-rights#:~:text=Human%20rights%20are%20rights%20inherent,and%20education%2C%20and%20many%20more.

[22] Denis G. Arnold, “Transnational Corporation and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights”, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 2, N°3 (Jul. 2010), p. 371-399.

[23] Martha C. Nussbaum in, Florian Wettstein, “CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divided”,Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 22, N°4 (Oct. 2012), p. 741.

[24] United Nations Development Program, “United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/in/UNGP-Brochure.pdf

[25] Denis G. Arnold, “Transnational Corporation and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights”, p. 378-379.

[26] Ibid.

[27] William H. Bishop, “The Role of Ethics in 21^st Century Organization”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 118, N°3 (Dec. 2013), p. 635-637.

[28] Timothy F. Fort, Cindy A. Schipiani, The Role of Business in Fostering Peaceful Societies (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 91.

[29] Ibid, p. 20-26. 

[30] R. Hamann, P. Kapelus, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Mining in Southern Africa: Fair accountability or just greenwash”, in Development, Vol. 47, Issue 3 (2004), p. 85-92.

[31] Robert McCorquodale, “Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 87 (2009), p. 385-400.

[32] John Paul Lederach, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation: Clear articulation of the guiding principles by a pioneer in the field (The Little Books of Justice & Peacebuilding, 2014).

[33] Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipiani, The Role of Business in Fostering Peaceful Societies, p. 109-139.

[34] Ibid, p. 102.

[35] Kevin Edmonds, “Revisiting the Cincinnati Enquirer vs. Chiquita”, NACLA, July 4^th, 2013; https://nacla.org/blog/2013/7/4/revisiting-cincinnati-enquirer-vs-chiquita

[36] Paulo Felipe Nieto, Juan Bernardo Sudarsky, “El Caso de los pagos de Chiquita Brands a los paramilitares en Colombia durante el periodo 1997-2004 : Un analisis de stakeholders” (Universidad de los Andes, 2007), p.56-57.

[37] Ibid, p. 31.

[38] Ibid, p. 63-73.

[39] Éver Veloza (alias “H.H.”), in Hollman Morris, “Las Victimas del Banano, el Caso Chiquita” (October 2009), Contravía TV, 29 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Or_rZe6GBv8&t=12s&ab_channel=CONTRAVIATV

[40] Julian Camilo Martinez, “Responsabilidad Penal de Personas Juridicas en el Conflicto Armado en Colombia. Estudio de Caso : La Chiquita Brands” (Universidad Catolica de Colombia), 37 pages.

[41] Nieto, Sudarsky, “El Caso de los pagos de Chiquita Brands a los paramilitares en Colombia durante el periodo 1997-2004 : Un analisis de stakeholders”, p.82.

[42] International Human Rights Clinic Harvard Law School, Collectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo, FIDH, “The Contribution of Chiquita corporate officials to crimes against humanity in Colombia, Article 15 Communication to the International Criminal Court”, May 2017, 57 pages.

[43] Amnesty International, “Colombia: Fear for Safety: Wilson Borja Diaz, trade union leader” (December 20, 2000); https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr23/104/2000/en/

[44] Amnesty International, “Colombia: Fear for Safety/Death Threats” (October 4, 2000); https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr23/103/2000/en/   

[45] Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, No mas violencia: testimonios para recordar, YouTube (2016); https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCcvtN7Uu_fnyPe1y53nFOaA

[46] Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, “Mi cuerpo fue territorio de guerra”, No mas violencia: testimonios para recordar, YouTube (2016), 2 minutes; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3W7mlFWG4sk&list=PLrA6flDRXIt6fLE4_zbr94HTNM7AOR29l&index=1&ab_channel=NoMasViolencia

[47] Angela Salazar, in Hollman Morris, “Las Victimas del Banano, el Caso Chiquita” (October 2009), Contravía TV, 29 minutes; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Or_rZe6GBv8&t=12s&ab_channel=CONTRAVIATV

[48] Ivan Cepeda, in Hollman Morris, “Las Victimas del Banano, el Caso Chiquita”

[49] Fort, Schipiani, The Role of Business in Fostering Peaceful Societies, p. 95.

[50] Jean Tirole, “Corporate Governance”, in Econometrica, Journal of the Economic Society, Vol. 69, N°1 (2001), pp. 1-35.

[51] Chiquita Brand International, “Chiquita Brand International, Inc. 2000 Corporate Responsibility Reports” (2000), p. 4.

[52] Ibid, p. 7.

[53] Ibid, p. 12.

[54] Ibid, p. 79. For another definition, see the work of Hamann and Kapelus, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Mining in Southern Africa: Fair Accountability or just greenwash.”

[55] Marco Werre, “Implementing Corporate Responsibility – The Chiquita Case” in Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 44 (2003), pp. 247-260.

[56] Chiquita Brand International, “Chiquita Brand International, Inc. 2000 Corporate Responsibility Reports”, p. 9.

[57] Ibid, p. 31.

[58] Social Accountability Standard, “SA8000 Standard”; https://sa-intl.org/programs/sa8000/

[59] As seen in Chapter 1 – Criteria to assess the ethics of Chiquita, these four levers of action include stimulating economic development, engaging in track-two diplomacy, welcoming external evaluation, and creating a sense of community within their employees. For coherence reasons, J. Bennett’s “Multinational Corporation, Social Responsibility, and Conflict” (Journal of International Affairs, 2002)will not be employed. Yet, this research acknowledges Bennett’s relevance in the field of business ethics and encourages anyone interested in the domain to read her work.

[60] Chiquita Brand International, “Chiquita Brand International, Inc. 2000 Corporate Responsibility Reports”, p. 32 and 48.

[61] Ibid, p. 12.

[62] Ibid, p. 82.

[63] Gloria Cuartas, in Hollman Morris, “Las Victimas del Banano, el Caso Chiquita”.